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IOLTA'S*LAST OBSTACLE:
WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUND. V.
MASSACHUSETTS BAR FOUND.'S" FAULTY
ANALYSIS OF ATTORNEYS' FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Risa I. Sackmary**s
INTRODUCTION

Thomas Jefferson once stated that "[t]o compel a man to
furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions
which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical."' These words ring
just as true today. When the State compels individuals to support
organizations which are contrary to their political or ideological
views, it violates their constitutional rights.2 Thus, due to the
element of compulsion, mandatory Interest on Lawyers Trust
Accounts programs (IOLTA) -- which require attorneys to use their

clients' money to support various organizations 3 -- directly violate
*

In Massachusetts, the program is called IOLTA, Interest on Lawyers' Trust

Accounts. Although other jurisdictions refer to this program as IOLA (Interest
on Lawyers' Accounts) or IOTA (Interest on Trust Accounts), this Comment will
use the Massachusetts terminology throughout.
993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993).
BLS Class of 1995. The author expresses gratitude for the assistance in
the preparation of this Comment to BLS Professors Carol Ziegler and Jeffrey W.
Stempel and to Note and Comment Editor Jordana Silverstein.
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 n.31 (1977) (quoting I.
BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALIST 354 (1948)).
2

See Washington Legal Found., 993 F.2d 962.

' IOLTA is a program through which client funds are placed in interest
bearing accounts for the benefit of a state bar foundation to provide legal
services to the needy persons of the community. Kenneth Paul Kreider, Note,
Florida'sIOLTA Program Does Not "Take" Client Propertyfor Public Use:
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attorneys' First Amendment rights. Washington Legal Found. v.
Massachusetts Bar Found.4 is the most recent case which exam-

ines the constitutionality of IOLTA programs. In Washington Legal
Found., attorneys and clients challenged the constitutionality of
Massachusetts' mandatory IOLTA program. The First Circuit held
that Massachusetts' program did not compel "financial support" of
IOLTA recipient organizations in violation of attorneys' First
Amendment rights of freedom of speech and association.6
In reaching this conclusion, however, the First Circuit used
faulty reasoning and failed to address serious concerns involving
attorneys' First Amendment rights. This Comment will draw
parallels to mandatory bar membership, labor union and government spending cases where members were compelled to contribute
dues and/or taxes to support political and ideological activities. By
comparing these cases to the case at issue, this Comment will show
how attorneys' First Amendment rights and the right to hold
employment regardless of political beliefs are fundamental rights.
Through this analysis, this Comment will show that compulsory
IOLTA programs that support activities against attorneys' political
and ideological beliefs violate these fundamental rights.
I.

HISTORY OF IOLTA

The purpose of IOLTA accounts is to give money to a
worthwhile organization rather than to give an interest-free loan to
a bank.7 Before the implementation of IOLTA programs, the
interest on clients' money, which was either nominal or held for a
Cone v. State Bar of Florida,57 U. CIN. L. REv. 369 (1988).
4 993 F.2d 962.
5 Id. at 969-70; MAss. S.J.C. RULE 3:07, CODE OF PROF. REsP.,
DR 9-102(C) (1993).
6 Id. at 967.

7 Betsy Borden Johnson, Comment, "With Liberty and Justice For All"
IOLTA in Texas - The Texas Equal Access to Justice System, 37 BAYLOR L.
REv. 725, 725 (1985).
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short period of time by an attorney, would be left with the bank. 8
In response to the decrease in public service funding over the past
decade and the initiation of Negotiable Orders of Withdrawal
(NOW) accounts, 9 courts, legislatures, and attorneys proposed
IOLTA programs."' In jurisdictions which permit IOLTA programs, attorneys are required to segregate clients' funds into "trust
accounts" unless they use the funds to reimburse previously
rendered services or pay fees." Subsequently, the bank must
disburse the accrued interest from these funds to non-profit
2
organizations specifically set up to receive the revenue.
Although several foreign jurisdictions have used the interest on

lawyers' trust accounts for public service projects since the 1960s,
it was not until 1981 that a jurisdiction within the United States
actually implemented an IOLTA plan.' 3 In 1971, the organized
bar of Florida initiated a study on the possible uses of interest in
8

Id. See also N.Y. JUD. §497 (1993). In New York, an attorney must deposit
"qualified funds" in an IOLA account in a banking institution of his or her
choice. "'Qualified funds' are moneys received by an attorney in a fiduciary
capacity from a client or beneficial owner and which, in the judgment of the
attorney, are too small in amount or are reasonably expected to be held for too
short a time to generate sufficient interest income to justify the expense of
administering a segregated account for the benefit of the client or beneficial
owner." N.Y. JUD. §497(2).
9 See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 802 (Fla. 1978).
NOW accounts apportion interest at a slightly lower rate than ordinary savings
accounts and are comparable to checking accounts. Id.
10 Id.

"Id. at 801. If clients' funds are not in clearly separate accounts from their
attorneys, the attorneys may encounter ethical problems relating to commingling
of funds. Id.
Note that all states, except for Indiana, now have some form of IOLTA
program. See it re Public Law No. 154-1990, 561 N.E.2d 791 (Ind. 1990).
12

Johnson, supra note 7, at 727.

Id. at 730-31. Since the 1960's, IOLTA programs created in Australia,
Canada, and parts of Africa channelled client trust funds into various law-related
public purposes. Id.
'3
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clients' trust funds for public programs designed to improve the
administration of justice.' 4 After five years of research, Florida's
Bar petitioned the Florida Supreme Court to approve a voluntary
IOLTA program. 5 Then, in 1981, the Florida Supreme Court
adopted the first IOLTA plan in the nation. 6 Florida's IOLTA
concept spread rapidly because of the drastic need in the 1980s to

improve America's legal system for the indigent. 7 Following its
lead, 49 states and the District of Columbia have now ratified
IOLTA programs, recognizing them as constitutionally and
ethically permissible. 8
Indiana stands alone in consistently refusing to accept IOLTA
programs.' 9 The Indiana Supreme Court has prohibited IOLTA
programs on the ground that the programs are unconstitutional and

14

See Kreider, supra note 3, at 372-74. The Florida Bar Association

encountered many obstacles when proposing an IOLTA program that the Florida
Supreme Court would adopt. The Internal Revenue Service was concerned that
an IOLTA program could become a breeding ground for yet unborn tax
avoidance schemes. Attorneys complained that the IOLTA plan was unwise
because the Bar Foundation would be the sole recipient of any earnings which
are generated by the plan. The court was concerned that attorneys might violate
the "taking" provisions of the federal Constitution when placing client funds in
IOLTA accounts. Furthermore, the bar members vehemently objected to the
possible conversion of the IOLTA program from a voluntary to a mandatory account. During all of the negotiations for proposing an acceptable IOLTA program, the Florida Supreme Court failed to address either clients' or attorneys'
possible First Amendment claims which could flow from the introduction of an
IOLTA account.
"5Johnson, supra note 7, at 731.

'6Id. at 731. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 390 (Fla.
1981).
'7

Johnson, supra note 7, at 726.

'8 See Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962,

968 (1st Cir. 1993).
'9

See In re Public Law No. 154-1990, 561 N.E.2d 791 (Ind. 1990); In re

Indiana State Bar Ass'n's Petition to Authorize a Program Governing Interest on
Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 550 N.E.2d 311 (Ind. 1990).
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unethical." Rejecting the Indiana bar's petition, the Indiana
Supreme Court has maintained that the IOLTA program violates
rules for discipline of attorneys and rules of professional conduct."1 The court was especially concerned that the IOLTA
program would be a vehicle for attorneys to commingle clients'
funds, a problem already plaguing the Indiana legal community and
the source of the greatest number of attorney disciplinary proceedings in the state.22 In particular, the court focused on the lack of
any requirement for disclosure to clients by participating attorneys.23 Additionally, the Indiana Supreme Court feared that
IOLTA accounts might induce attorneys to believe that they could
satisfy their pro bono obligations when, in fact, they would simply
be transferring wealth.24
While many states have modeled their IOLTA programs after
Florida's, they have differed on whether their programs should be

20

See In re Indiana State Bar Ass'n's Petition, 550 N.E.2d at 313-16; In re

Public Law No. 154-1990, 561 N.E.2d at 793-94.
However, note that the Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
has found nothing in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility that
"prohibits a lawyer from participating in state-authorized programs ... which use

interest earned on bank accounts in which are deposited clients' funds, nominal
in amount or to be held for short periods of time, providing for the interest to be
paid to certain tax-exempt organizations." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 348 (1982).
21

In re Indiana State Bar Ass'n's Petition, 440 N.E.2d at 313-316.

2Id.
23

24

at 312.

Id.

Id.at 313. In contrast, the Indiana Supreme Court in In re Public Law No.
154-1990, 561 N.E.2d at 793-94, struck down the proposed IOLTA program
because its immunity clause shielded attorneys from disciplinary action for
participation in the statutory trust program. The court stated that, without the
immunity clause, the remaining provisions of the Act could have no practical
legal effect.
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mandatory, voluntary or "opt-out."25 In a voluntary program,
participating attorneys open IOLTA accounts with their financial
institutions and then inform the local bar foundation that the
account has been established.2 ' A non-participating attorney in a
voluntary IOLTA program, however, may impute short-term and
nominal amounts to non-interest bearing accounts. In contrast,
with an "opt-out" procedure, lawyers must exclude themselves
during an annual opt-out period if they do not want to participate
in the IOLTA program.2 Finally, in a mandatory program, the
state requires that all lawyers' trust funds earn interest either for
the client or for the specified IOLTA organizations to which
contributions are made.29
II.

IOLTA TODAY:

WASHINGTON

MASSACHUSETTS LEGAL

LEGAL

FOUND. v.

FOUND.3°

In Washington Legal Found.,31 attorneys and clients claimed
that Massachusetts' mandatory IOLTA program violated their

2 As of September 15, 1991, 29 programs were voluntary, 12 were
mandatory and 9 were "opt-out." Rachael Scovill Worthington, Comment, IOTA -

Overcoming Its Current Obstacles, 18 STETSON L. REv. 415, 419-20 (1989); W.

VA. CODE § 1.15(d)-(f) (1993) (voluntary program established by the court on
November 29, 1989, effective January 1, 1990; changed to mandatory program
by the court, on July 25, 1991, effective September 15, 1991).
26

Worthington, supra note 25, at 419.

27

Id.

2

Id. at 420.

29 Id. at 421.
30

993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993).

31id.
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constitutional rights.32 The program that was at issue required

32

Id. at 969-970; MAss. SJ.C. RULE 3:07, CODE OF PROF. RESP.,

DR 9-102(C).
Massachusetts' IOLTA program is based on Rule 3:07 of the Massachusetts
Supreme Court which states:
Each lawyer who holds client funds shall deposit such funds, as appropriate, in one of two types of interest-bearing accounts: either a pooled
account ("IOLTA account") for all client funds which in the judgment
of the lawyer are nominal in amount, or are to be held for a short
period of time, or an individual account with the interest payable as
directed by the client for all other client funds; provided, however, that
an account in the name of an attorney in a lending bank used exclusively for depositing and disbursing funds in connection with the bank's
loan transactions ("conveyancing accounts") shall not be required but is
permitted to be established as an IOLTA account. All IOLTA accounts
shall be established in compliance with the following provisions:
(1)
The IOLTA account shall be established with any bank,
savings and loan association, or credit union authorized by Federal or
State law to do business in Massachusetts and insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation or similar State insurance programs for
State-chartered institutions. Funds in the IOLTA account shall be
subject to withdrawal upon request and without delay...
(4)
This court shall appoint members of a permanent IOLTA Committee to fixed terms on a staggered basis. The representatives appointed
to the committee shall oversee the operation of a comprehensive IOLTA
program, including:
(a)
the receipt of all IOLTA funds and their
disbursement, net of actual expenses, to the designated charitable entities, as follows: sixty-seven
percent (67%) to the Massachusetts Legal Assistance
Corporation and the remaining thirty-three percent
(33%) to other designated charitable entities in such
proportions as the Judicial Court may order...
(5)
The Massachusetts Legal Assistance Corporation and other
designated charitable entities shall receive IOLTA funds from the
IOLTA Committee and distribute such funds for approved purposes.
The Massachusetts Legal Assistance Corporation may use IOLTA funds
to further its corporate purpose and other designated charitable entities
may use IOLTA funds either for (1) improving the administration of

194

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

lawyers or law firms to direct the banks holding their IOLTA
accounts to disburse accrued interest to the IOLTA Committee.33
After the IOLTA Committee receives the money, it must then
disburse 67 percent of all IOLTA funds to Massachusetts Legal
Assistance and the remaining 33 percent to "other designated
charities.0 4 Because Massachusetts' statute is compulsory, its
IOLTA program has eliminated any choice attorneys have in
designating the recipient of the interest that has accrued on their
clients' accounts. 5
Although the interest earned in an IOLTA account is the

designated charity's property and not the attorney's, 36 the attorney
does have standing to direct the interest. 37 The First Circuit
applied Whitmore v. Arkansas' straightforward Article III approach
to determine whether the attorney, in Washington Legal Found.,
had standing. 38 Under Whitmore, litigants must first demonstrate
that they have suffered an "injury in fact" to establish an Article III
case or controversy.39 Second, litigants must allege facts which
justice or (2) delivering civil legal services to those who cannot afford
them.
33 MAss.

S.J.C. RULE 3:07, CODE OF PROF. REsP., DR 9-102(C).

34 id.

31 See Washington Legal Found., 993 F.2d at 968.
36

See Kreider, supra note 3, at 374.

37 Washington Legal Found., 993

F.2d at 971-72. See Bender v. Williamsport
Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541-542 (1986) (holding that standing requirements are most strictly enforced in cases where constitutional questions are
presented).
31 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); Washington Legal

Found., 993 F.2d at 971-72.
31 Whitnwre, 495 U.S. at 155 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501

(1975); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974), vacated, Spomer v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 514 (1974); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02
(1983)). The Supreme Court has defined an "injury in fact" as an injury to one's
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show that "the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action'

and 'is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." '40 In
Washington Legal Found., the First Circuit held that attorneys have
standing because the IOLTA Rule forces them to choose whether

to practice law.4" Since attorneys may be unable to practice law
unless they follow this Rule, the First Circuit found that the
attorney sufficiently alleged an "injury in fact" traceable to the
IOLTA Rule which could be remedied by the relief requested.42

Further, using the same approach, it found that the client also had
standing.43 Thus, it found that the attorney adequately proved that
he had standing.
After holding that both the client and attorney have standing,
the First Circuit applied a Fifth Amendment analysis.' By

applying this test, the court found that clients do not have a
constitutionally protected property right to exclude others from the
beneficial use of their funds while those funds are deposited in

self that is "distinct and palpable," as opposed to "abstract," and the alleged harm
must be "actual or imminent," not "conjectural" or "hypothetical." Id.
4 Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155(quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976) and Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
41

993 F.2d at 972.

42

Id.

' Id. The First Circuit found that the client had standing to challenge the
IOLTA Rule because she had stated an actual injury to herself which was
traceable to the IOLTA Rule and could be remedied by the relief sought. Due to
her business' use of lawyers, the client alleged standing to challenge the Rule on
the ground that she had indirectly placed her funds in IOLTA accounts. She.
further claimed that the IOLTA Rule violated her First Amendment rights of free
speech and association.

44Id. at

976.
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IOLTA accounts. 45 In reaching its decision, the court found that
the IOLTA program leaves the deposited funds untouched, the
funds are always available to the clients, and the interest earned on
IOLTA accounts is not the clients' property. 46 In short, clients do
not have a constitutionally protected Fifth Amendment right
because the mandatory IOLTA program does not occupy or invade
their property. 47
In determining whether the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights
were abridged, the First Circuit articulated a two-part strict scrutiny
test.4 Under the first prong of this test, the court examined
whether the IOLTA Rule burdens protected speech by "forcing
expression through compelled support of organizations espousing
ideologies or engaging in political activities. 49 If the court
determined that free speech was burdened, it would next inquire
whether the IOLTA Rule "serves compelling state interests through
means narrowly tailored and germane to the state's interests." 50 In
this case, the court came to a halt after the first step because it
found that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege that the IOLTA
Rule compels a connection between themselves and the recipient

4' Id. See also Cone v. State Bar of Fla., 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 917 (1987) (holding that clients do not have a property interest
in the proceeds from an IOLTA account because they do not have a "legitimate
expectation of interest").
For a further discussion on how courts have found that clients do not have
a constitutionally protected property right in interest placed in IOLTA accounts,
see Cone, 819 F.2d 1002; Kreider, supra note 3; Philip F. Downey, "Attorneys'
Trust Accounts: The Bar'sRole in the Preservationof ClientProperty, 49 OHIo

ST. L.J. 275 (1988).
46

Washington Legal Found., 993 F.2d at 976.

47

Id.

48 Id. at 977.
49 Id.

50Id.
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organizations. 5'

III.

IOLTA RULE BURDENS PROTECTED SPEECH

The First Circuit erred when it determined that Massachusetts'
mandatory IOLTA Rule did not burden protected speech. 2
Because it specifically stated that Massachusetts' IOLTA Rule is
compulsory for attorneys and that First Amendment rights may be
burdened when individuals are compelled to support an organization engaging in activities contrary to their beliefs, the First
Circuit should have found that the attorney's rights were violated
by the IOLTA Rule. 3 Moreover, the First Circuit inadequately
followed the Supreme Court's rulings in analogous cases involving
First Amendment violations in areas such as union support, 54 bar
membership 5 and the government's spending power.5 6 The First
Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's holding that, when constitutional issues are involved, employees shall not be required to
finance activities against their beliefs as a condition of employment
unless the contributions are used to regulate the legal profession. 7
However, while acknowledging that attorneys' current employment
may be terminated in compulsory IOLTA jurisdictions when
attorneys are forced to finance organizations with opposing
viewpoints, the First Circuit ignored the Supreme Court's determi-

51

Id. at 979.

52

Id.

51

Id. at 976-78.

51 See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431, U.S. 209 (1977); Ellis v.
Brotherhood of Ry. Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
55 See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar of Calif., 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Lathrop v.
Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
56

See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).

57 See Keller, 496 U.S. 1; Abood, 431 U.S. 209; Flast, 392 U.S. 83.

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
nation that the opportunity to practice law is a "fundamental
right".5 The First Circuit also neglected to articulate
circumstances in which the payment for dues to improve the
quality of legal services would be political in nature or where the
improvement of legal services would be dubious. 59 Furthermore,
the First Circuit failed to address the government spending power
cases which stress the importance of taxpayers' rights under the
Establishment Clause.'
A.

Support of Organizationsas a Condition of Employment

After announcing that the IOLTA Rule is compulsory for
attorneys, the First Circuit asserted that compelled support of an
organization engaging in expressive activities may burden First
Amendment rights.61 The court then failed to show that the
compulsory IOLTA plan did not violate attorneys' First Amendment rights.62 Had the First Circuit relied on the union support
cases which held that employees may not be compelled to engage
in political and ideological activities to which they are opposed as
a condition of their employment, it would have reached a different
conclusion.63 Instead, the First Circuit would have found that
attorneys may not be compelled by IOLTA programs to participate
in activities against their personal beliefs in order to practice law,

" Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281 (1985); see
Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962 (1993).
59

See Washington Legal Found., 993 F.2d at 976.

60

See Flast, 392 U.S. 83.

61

Washington Legal Found., at 976-78 (emphasis added).

62Id.

(emphasis added).

See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Ellis v.
Brotherhood of Ry. Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
63
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a fundamental right.64
A union and an employer may demand that all employees
become union members. However, a union may not require those
employees to contribute to union activities "beyond those germane
to collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance
adjustment." 5 The Supreme Court held in Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Education' that employers may not require individuals to relinquish rights guaranteed to them by the First Amendment as a
condition of employment. In that case, various governmental

employees challenged a Michigan statute authorizing all governmental employees, even those who were not union members, to pay
for union dues as a condition of employment.67 The Court concluded that the Constitution requires that expenditures financed
from dues must be paid by employees who do not object to
advancing the proposed ideas and who are not coerced into doing
so by the threat of loss of governmental employment.68
' Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281 (1985) (recognizing
that the opportunity to practice law is a "fundamental right").
See also Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. 458, 460-461 (D. N.M. 1982) ('The
First Amendment does not distinguish between lawyers and other occupations.
Unless there is an important governmental interest requiring otherwise, lawyers
are entitled to the same protections from the compelled support of ideas that are
afforded labor union members.').
" Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990);
Communications Workers v. Beek, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
6 431 U.S. at 231, 235-36; see also Ellis, 466 U.S. 435, 442, 455 (Clerical
employees objected to the use of their compelled dues for specified union
activities against the national union. The Court held that dissenting employees
are protected under the First Amendment from the union's use of their funds. In
exacting a remedy, the court found that a rebate scheme by which the union
reimbursed objecting employees for their share of union expenditures was
inadequate to protect the dissenting employees' rights. Given several acceptable
alternatives, the Court emphasized that the union could not, even temporarily, be
allowed to commit dissenters' funds to improper uses.).

6'431

U.S. at 211-213.

1 Id. at 231. The Supreme Court in Abood made it clear that its holding
applies equally to employees in the private sector.
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As in Abood, the attorney plaintiff in Washington Legal Found.

alleged that he had to comply with the IOLTA program to maintain
his livelihood, despite his belief that the IOLTA Rule compelled
him to support political and ideological views which he disavowed. 69 In response, the First Circuit found that the burden
placed on him was more than an inconvenience, although something less than forcing him to lose his employment.' This
determination conflicts with the court's acknowledgement that
attorneys cannot engage in the full practice of law without holding
client funds, an event which mandates compliance with the IOLTA
Rule.71 Thus, despite its contradictory conclusion, the court
indirectly confirms the fact that the IOLTA Rule burdens attorneys'
fundamental right to practice law72 by maintaining that attorneys
73
cannot practice law without complying with the IOLTA Rule.
B.

Expenditures Not Used To Regulate Legal Profession
Or Improve Legal Services

In addition to its determination that employees cannot be
compelled to relinquish First Amendment rights as a condition of
employment, the Supreme Court has held that compelled financial
support of bar associations, that engage in political or ideological
activities, implicates First Amendment rights when those funds are
used to subsidize ideological or political activities.74 In the

69 993 F.2d 962, 978 (1st Cir. 1993).
7

Id.

71

Id.

' See, Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281 (1985).
73

Washington Legal Found., 993 F.2d at 978.

4 Keller v. State Bar of Calif., 496 U.S. 1, 13 (1990).
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integrated bar75 cases, the Court qualified its position by stating
that expenditures only violate attorneys' First Amendment rights
when the expenditures are not "necessarily or reasonably incurred
for the purpose of regulating the legal profession or 'improving the
quality of legal services available to the people of the state."' 76
The Supreme Court noted that the standard for determining what

actually regulates the legal profession or improves the quality of
legal services would often be unclear.77
78 the Supreme
Until the case of Keller v. State Bar of Calif.,
Court had not made a definitive determination as to which
activities could be subsidized by the revenue produced by compulsory bar membership dues. There, the State Bar of California used
compulsory bar dues to finance political and ideological activities
to which some of the members were opposed.79 Some of the
particular activities challenged by the members were described in
the complaint as follows:
75 Id. at 1. An "integrated bar" is "an association of attorneys in which
membership and dues are required as a condition of practicing law--created under
state law to regulate the State's legal profession."

76 Keller, 496 U.S. at 13 (quoting Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843
(1961)).
7'Id.

at 15.

78 Keller, 496

U.S. 1; see also Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 843 (1961). In Lathrop,
a Wisconsin lawyer challenged the state bar association's use of dues to
influence legislation on issues with which he did not agree. The lawyer sued for
a refund of dues paid to the Wisconsin State Bar that were required as a
condition of practicing law in Wisconsin.
Due to a segmented opinion, Lathrop does not provide a clear holding to
guide constitutional questions. A plurality of four members of the Supreme Court
(Brennan, J., Warren, Ch. J., Clark, J. and Stewart, J.) found that the requirement
was not unconstitutional on its face and that the question was not ripe because
the court could not see what the funds were being used to support. In its
reasoning, however, the plurality developed the guiding standard in these types
of questions that the challenged expenditures must be necessarily or reasonably
incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession or "improving the
quality of the legal service available to the people of the State." Id.
79 Keller, 496 U.S. at 4, 6.
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(1)
Lobbying for or against state legislation providing
that laws designating that the punishment of life imprisonment without parole shall apply to minors tried as adults
and convicted of murder with a special circumstance;
(2)

Filing amicus curiae briefs in cases involving a
requirement that attorney-public officials disclose
names of clients; and

(3)

The adoption of resolutions by the Conference of
Delegates opposing federal legislation limiting
federal-court jurisdiction over abortions, public
school prayer and busing.8°

Examining the various activities that the compulsory dues supported, the Supreme Court found that the use of compulsory dues
violated members' First Amendment right of free speech when the
expenditures were not "reasonably incurred for the purpose of
regulating the legal profession or improving the quality of legal
services."81
While the Keller Court formulated an inquiry for determining
when the use of compulsory dues may infringe upon First Amendment rights, it was unable to articulate under what circumstances
the test would be satisfied.82 The Supreme Court noted that:
[p]recisely where the line falls between those State Bar
activities in which the officials and members of the Bar are
acting essentially as professional advisors to those ultimately charged with the regulation of the legal profession, on
the one hand, and those activities having political or
ideological coloration which are not reasonably related to
the advancement of such goals, on the other, will not

' Id. at 6, n.2.
1' Id. at 14.
2Id. at 15-16.
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always be easy to discern."
In attempting to determine parameters for this inquiry, the Court
directed that compulsory dues may not endorse "a gun control or
nuclear weapons freeze initiative" but may be used for "disciplining
members
of the Bar or proposing ethical codes for the profes'' 4
sion. 8
Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that organizations
may incur additional inconveniences or burdens when ensuring that
compulsory dues are used only for permissible purposes, it
concluded that these burdens or inconveniences are "hardly
sufficient to justify contravention of the constitutional mandate."8
The Supreme Court found these inconveniences were particularly
insignificant because associations are already constitutionally
required, when collecting fees, to "include an adequate explanation
of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decisionmaker, and
an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while such
challenges are pending." 6 By requiring associations to account for
the uses of their fees, the Supreme Court recognizes that contributors have a right to support only those activities in which they
believe. Unfortunately, courts often have been vague in determining
the circumstances in which contributors are entitled to First
Amendment protection.
Various lower courts have attempted to clarify the standard for
determining exactly when an integrated bar, through compulsory
dues, supports activities that violate attorneys' First Amendment
83

1d. at 15.

8MId. at 16.
8 Id. at 16-17.

' Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 310 (1986) (finding
that the union procedure which established "proportionate share" payments used
to meet expenses of the collective bargaining process and contract administration
were unconstitutional because they "failed to provide adequate justification for
the advance reduction of dues" and they "failed to offer a reasonably prompt
decisions by an impartial decision maker").
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rights.87 The Montana Supreme Court held that the state integrated
bar could not use funds derived from compulsory dues for lobbying
purposes unless it refunded dissenting members an aliquot portion
of their compulsory dues.88 Furthermore, a District Court agreed
with the Montana Supreme Court and added that the use of bar
dues to finance lobbying for or against proposed items of state
legislation in order to promote the administration of justice did not
serve important governmental interests and would not justify
infringing upon bar members' First Amendment rights.89
Because many "legal" issues are inherently "political," and the
"exact line this standard draws is still quite fuzzy, ' courts will
be continuously bombarded with questions concerning the constitutional permissibility of a wide range of political and ideological
programs. 91 Although providing financial support for attorney
disciplinary proceedings and continuing legal education are clearly
permissible examples of regulating the legal profession, the
Massachusetts IOLTA program has numerous activities which
could be considered activities with "political or ideological
coloration" not related to the advancement of the State Bar

TSee Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. 458 (D. N.M. 1982); Reynolds v. State
Bar of Mont., 660 P.2d 581 (Mont. 1983) (Shea, J., concurring).
Reytwlds, 660 P.2d 581.
89 Arrow,

544 F. Supp. 458.

0 David F. Addicks, Renovating the Bar After Keller v. State Bar of
California: A Proposalfor Strict Limits on Compulsory Fee Expenditure, 25
U.S.F. L. REV. 681, 701, 709 (1991).
"' Edwin J. Lukas, Note, Constitutional Law -- First Amendment --

Compulsory State Bar Associations May Use Mandatory Dues Payments For
Politicalor IdeologicalProgramsWhen Such Expenditures Are Necessarily or
Reasonably Incurred For The Purpose Of Regulating The Profession Or
Improving The Quality Of Legal Services. Keller v. State Bar of California,68
U. DET. L. REv. 297, 304 (1991).
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goals.9" Due to their political undertones, these activities would
not pass the Supreme Court's vague First Amendment test. For
example, although attorneys may believe in limiting the number of
foreigners allowed to immigrate into the United States, last year
$525,795.00 was given to the Southeastern Massachusetts Legal
Assistance Corporation which helps finance the Cambodian
Outreach program conducting special outreach to newly arrived
clients from Cambodia. 93 Also, because the topic of AIDS and
gay rights is very controversial, some attorneys may be opposed to
contributing $53,000.00 to the Gay and Lesbian Advocates and
Defenders, which supports pro bono legal services combating HIV
discrimination, with IOLTA funds. 94 Even if attorneys' views on
these issues may not be popular, the First Amendment allows
individuals to assert their beliefs and choose to support -- or not to
support -- whatever they wish. When attorneys are not given an
opportunity to refuse to financially support a particular organization, the bar association compels the objector to embrace a
repugnant political ideology and therefore, violate their First

92 See 1992-1993 Grants and Grantee Profiles distributed by the
Massachusetts IOLTA Committee [hereinafter Grantee Profiles].
For example, $25,000.00 was given to Social Justice for Women which
seeks to find alternative sentencing options for low-income women. Id. at 16.
This funding may violate attorneys' First Amendment rights if they believe that
low-income women who commit crimes should not be treated differently than
more affluent women or equally poor men. Similarly, attorneys may not agree
with giving $18,500.00 to the Alliance for Young Families, Id. at 17., which
provides legal support to pregnant teens because they feel that helping pregnant
teens encourages teen pregnancies. Furthermore, the IOLTA Committee grants
vast amounts of money to various housing projects which support tenant rights.
Id. at 7, 10. If attorneys represent landlords, this may pose a conflict of interest.

9 Id. at 8. Additionally, attorneys may not agree with the religious or
immigration aspects of $39,000.00 given to Boston Catholic Charities to assist
Haitian immigrants to file for political asylum through the Haitian Asylum
Project. Id. at 14.
94 Id. at 18. Similarly, the IOLTA Committee gave $264,277.00 to the
Cambridge and Somerville Legal Services to help finance the AIDS Disability
Benefits Project. Id. at 11.
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Amendment rights. 9 In sum, what may be a "cause" for one
attorney may be an "abhorrence" to another.
C.

Support of Religious Organizations

Although tax dollars are often used to support organizations
whose views are contrary to certain taxpayers' beliefs, the Supreme
Court has limited Congress' taxing and spending power when the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment is violated. 6 Yet,
when the First Circuit examined Massachusetts' particular IOLTA
program, it overlooked the importance that constitutional freedoms
place on an organization's spending power by failing to note the
emphasis placed on First Amendment rights by the taxing and
spending power cases. Even if all First Amendment freedoms are
not treated equally, the First Circuit should have, at the very least,
disallowed the IOLTA Committee supporting religious organizations.97

In granting standing to taxpayers only when First Amendment
rights are infringed upon,9" the Supreme Court stressed that the
Constitution limits the support of organizations by public agencies.
In Flastv. Cohen, the Supreme Court found that the Establishment
Clause "operates as a specific constitutional limitation upon
Congress' exercise of the taxing and spending power conferred by
99 In fact, the Court noted that our history
Article I, Section 8."

9'Jeffrey R. Parker, FirstAnendment Proscriptionson the Integrated Bar:
Lathrop v. Donohue Re-Examined, 22 ARIz. L. REv. 939, 964 (1980).
9 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 83, 102-06 (1968); Lamont v.
Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 835 (2d Cir. 1991).
97 In 1992-1993, the Massachusetts IOLTA Committee supported the Jewish
Family Service of Worcester, Boston Catholic Charities and, the Catholic
Charitable Bureau of Boston. Grantee Profiles, supra note 92, at 14, 17, 18.

98 Flast, 392 U.S. at 87.
' Id. at 104. After the Supreme Court found that the taxpayers in Flast had
standing to challenge Congress' expenditures when they are in derogation of
constitutional provisions, it remanded the decision on the merits of the taxpayers'
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"vividly illustrates" that the drafters of the Establishment Clause
specifically feared that "the taxing and spending power would be
used to favor one religion over another or to support religion in
general."'" The Court relied on this history when it held that a
taxpayer has standing to claim that Congress' taxing and spending
violates the constitutional provisions that limit its taxing and
spending power. 1 ' Because the Supreme Court followed the
dictates of the First Amendment, the holding in Flast has been
followed by numerous lower courts.'l
If the First Circuit had followed Flast when it examined the
claim to the lower courts. The taxpayers, however, chose not to pursue their case
on the merits. In response to an "apparently unsympathetic court," the taxpayers
decided to wait for a "more favorable climate" than that which existed in 1968.
Rosanne R. Pisem, The Second Circuit and the Establishment Clause: Shoring
Up A Crumbling Wall, 51 BROOK. L. REv. 642, 656-657, n.62 (1985).
,oo Flast, 392 U.S. at 103.
Id. at 105-06.
02

Id. Lower courts have consistently allowed taxpayers to bring suit when
rights under the Establishment Clause are implicated. See, e.g., Protestants and
Other Ams. United for Separation of Church and State v. Watson, 407 F.2d
1264, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (holding that taxpayers have standing when
challenging the Postmaster General's expenditures incurred in issuing a
commemorative Christmas stamp that is allegedly religious in nature); Lamont
v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 830 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that taxpayers have
standing to challenge the Office of American Schools and Hospitals Abroad for
alleged violation of Establishment Clause through appropriation and expenditure
of public funds for construction, maintenance, and operation of religious school
abroad).
Additionally, lower courts have uniformly prohibited taxpayers from bringing
suit when First Amendment Establishment Clause rights are not involved. See,
e.g., Taub v. Commonwealth of Ky., 842 F.2d 912,918-919(6th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988) (holding that the taxpayer lacked standing when
challenging Kentucky statutes involving the Commonwealth's dealings with an
auto manufacturer because the taxpayer presented a generalized, not direct injury,
from these dealings); Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F.2d 171, 175(5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 923 (1970) (dismissing case for lack of standing when
taxpayer challenged constitutionality of alleged acts regarding establishment of
legal aid service programs because there is no legislative intent to protect
appellants' competitive interest).
1
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organizations that the attorney is compelled to support, it would
have given due weight to the universal importance that courts have
given First Amendment concerns when the question of compelled
support of organizations is involved. By ignoring the violation of
attorneys' rights when they are compelled to support organizations
with religious affiliations, the First Circuit disregarded the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the cases that limit
the government's spending power when the Establishment Clause
is involved. 3 Specifically, the First Circuit should have prohibited the Massachusetts IOLTA Committee from contributing
$15,518.00 in 1992-1993 to Jewish Family Service of Worcester,
$39,000 to Boston Catholic Charities, and $40,000 to Catholic
Charitable Bureau of Boston"° because this support is in violation of the letter and spirit surrounding the Establishment
Clause.
IV.

5
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST AT ISSUE IN IOLTA
RULE CAN BE ACHIEVED THROUGH LESS RESTRICTIVE

MEANS

When the First Circuit developed its two-part inquiry in
Washington Legal Found., it failed to address the second part of

the test because it found that the plaintiffs did not succeed on the
first part'0 6 However, the second question should have been
addressed because the First Circuit erred in its determination that

the IOLTA Rule does not burden protected speech. A proper
application of the strict scrutiny test would have revealed that the
IOLTA Rule does not serve compelling state interests necessary to
overcome governmental objectives.
The Supreme Court has promulgated a "balancing test" for

1o' Washington Legal Found., 993 F.2d 962.
'0' Grantee

Profiles, supra note 92, at 14, 17, 18.

'o' See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 103.
'06

993 F.2d at 980.
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determining infringements upon First Amendment freedoms.
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In

this test, courts determine whether infringements on the right to
associate for expressive purposes may be justified by regulations
adopted to serve compelling state interests that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms. 108 The government has the burden of meeting the threshold
requirement that the state interest in the regulation infringing upon
the First Amendment right is one of vital importance. °9
Because IOLTA goals can be achieved through less restrictive

107 See

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).

'0' Id. In Roberts, the Supreme Court developed its formula for determining
when First Amendment rights are infringed upon. Id. In that case, the United
States Jaycees challenged the application of a Minnesota statute forbidding
discrimination on the basis of sex in "places of public accommodation." Id. at
609. The Supreme Court reasoned that the application of the Act to compel the
Jaycees to accept female members may have violated either their freedom of
intimate association or their freedom of expressive association. Id. at 618.
However, it held that the effect that the statute had on the Jaycees' freedom of
association was justified by Minnesota's interest in eliminating discrimination
against its female citizens. Id. at 627.
" Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976). The Michigan Supreme Court
in Falk v. State Bar of Mich., 305 N.W.2d 201 (Mich.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
925 (1981), attempted to follow the opinions discussed above. Although it was
unable to secure a clear majority, the court held that an integrated state bar could
only compulsorily exact dues, and require the association to support duties and
functions of the state bar that served a compelling state interest and which could
not be accomplished by means less intrusive upon individual attorneys' First
Amendment rights. Id. at 202. (Coleman, CJ., Moody, J., Levin, J., Kavanagh,
J., Williams, J., Fitzgerald, J. and Ryan, J., concurring).
Similarly, the District Court in Carroll v. Blinken, 768 F. Supp. 1030,
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), affld in part, rev'd in part,957 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 300 (1992) found that a student's First Amendment rights
were not violated when a portion of his mandatory dues were used to support a
public interest research group. Id. at 1036. In reaching its conclusion, the court
noted that the university funded over 100 student organizations to create a
diverse forum for public discussion for training undergraduates to become concemed public citizens. Id. at 1034. The District Court held that individuals do not
have the constitutional right to control their contributions when universities spend
money to "expand public debate on a content-neutral basis." Id.
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means by using voluntary and "opt-out" programs, 110 these
alternative programs should be used to protect attorneys' First
Amendment rights. Many attorneys have been opposed to the
courts' and legislatures' suggestions of changing voluntary IOLTA
programs to mandatory ones."' Although mandatory IOLTA
accounts earn more than both voluntary and "opt-out" programs," 2 the additional money which may be earned does not
excuse the serious impingements on attorneys' First Amendment
rights. Mere financial considerations or administrative efficiency
does not justify an abridgement of First Amendment rights." 3
Voluntary and "opt-out" programs still give public service organizations the money they need, but these types of programs do not
require attorneys to invest money into organizations which are
contrary to their political and ideological philosophies or jeopardize
their jobs. Furthermore, if IOLTA programs are voluntary, courts
will not be constantly required to monitor the program's activities
to ensure they are truly regulating the legal profession." 4

1o

See Patricia Heim, Voluntary Bar vs. Mandatoty Bar: The Debate Heats

Up, 64 Wis. LAW. 10, 12 (Feb. 1991).
.In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d at 389. When the Florida Bar
Foundation, Inc. considered changing its program from a voluntary IOLTA to a
mandatory IOLTA, it solicited comments from all interested parties. It received
an "outpouring of mail and filings, predominately hostile to the proposed
changes." Id. at 391. It heard from attorneys, law firms, bar associations, bar
committees, law schools, the Florida Bankers' Association and various public
interest law organizations. Id. The Foundation's proposal that the IOLTA
program should be converted from a voluntary to a mandatory program elicited
a fervor among bar members. Id. From all of these responses and various court
cases, the Supreme Court of Florida decided to adopt a voluntary program rather
than a mandatory program. Id.
Don J. DeBenedictis, IOLTA Earnings Down, 78 A.B.A. J. 16, 16 (Oct.
1992). The author of this article stated that each step up (from voluntary to optout to mandatory) increases the number of trust accounts. Id.
1'

" Spencer v. Herdesty, 571 F. Supp. 444, 452 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (emphasis
added).
14

See Heim, supra note 110, at 63.
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In the alternative, if legislatures and courts insist upon a
mandatory approach, IOLTA goals can also be achieved by
allowing attorneys to choose which programs they will support or
designating the money from IOLTA to support programs that
unequivocally regulate the legal profession. Even if a state refuses
to accept voluntary or "opt-out" programs because it will lose
revenue, it should give attorneys discretion in selecting which
programs to support in a mandatory IOLTA system. If attorneys are
given a comprehensive checklist of programs, they will not be
compelled to support organizations which represent political or
ideological ideas contrary to their own. Moreover, public service
organizations will still be able to receive the interest from all
attorney trust accounts. Even if legislatures find administrative
inconveniences with this approach, the Supreme Court would likely
allow it because "the Constitution recognizes higher values than
speed and efficiency. '
CONCLUSION

Because the Supreme Court has never examined an IOLTA
plan, the controversy over the permissibility of IOLTA accounts
still looms large." 6 When determining the constitutionality of

IOLTA programs, attorneys must, therefore, look to the lower
courts and analogous Supreme Court cases for guidance." 7

Unfortunately, with respect to compulsory IOLTA plans, courts
have neglected to properly address the concomitant First Amend..Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (quoting Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)).
116The

Supreme Court has denied certiorari on Cone v. State Bar of Fla.,

819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 917 (1987) and Carroll v. State
Bar, 213 Cal. Rptr. 305 (Cal. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 848 (1985).

Paul Marcotte, Big Interest in Small Change, 73 A.B.A. J. 70, 70 (July
1987). The Florida bar's general counsel stated that, "[t]he missing piece in the
whole equation is whether these programs will be reviewed one day by the
Supreme Court."
117 See,

e.g., In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 806-07 (Fla.
1978); Abood, 431 U.S. at 235, n.31.
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ment violations.
In Washington Legal Found.,"' the First Circuit ignored

significant issues surrounding the attorneys' First Amendment
claims." 9 The First Circuit held that the IOLTA Rule does not
burden attorneys' protected speech, but declined to examine
whether Massachusetts had a compelling state interest in restricting
the attorneys' First Amendment rights. 20 Since the State has the
burden of showing that compelled contribution is necessary to
serve overriding governmental objectives, 12 1 it is unlikely that the
State would have prevailed on the second part of the court's
inquiry: whether compelling state interests could be achieved
through less restrictive means.
Because the goals of IOLTA programs are worthwhile, the
programs should not be eliminated outright. Clearly there is a need
to provide legal services to the disadvantaged. However, IOLTA
programs should be modified to obtain a balance between the
States' interest in providing public legal services with attorneys'
First Amendment rights. Either by adopting voluntary or "opt-out"
programs or allowing attorneys to choose the organizations they
wish to support, states can accommodate the needs of both the
government and the attorneys. As the Supreme Court emphasized
in Keller, 22 additional inconveniences or burdens to ensure that
compulsory dues are used only for purposes designated by
attorneys are inconsequential compared
to the need to protect
1 23
individuals' First Amendment rights.

11

993 F.2d 962 (lst Cir. 1993).

119

Id.

Id. at 980.
121Elrod
1

v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976).

Keller v. State Bar of Calif., 496 U.S. 1 (1990).

'2 3 Id. at 16.

